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Kletsel: Cut Athletes' Injunction Hail Mary: Covid-19 and the Unveiling of

CUT ATHLETES’ INJUNCTION HAIL MARY: COVID-19 AND
THE UNVEILING OF TITLE IX NONCOMPLIANCE
IN COLLEGIATE SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION: TITLE IX, COLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, AND COVID-19
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states that
“[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.”1 While the statute does not
expressly mention intercollegiate athletics, “it has long been interpreted to apply to all aspects of an institution’s operations, including athletic programs.” 2 Regulations promulgated by the
Department of Education provide that no person, on the basis of
sex, be discriminated against in any athletic program.3 This regulation requires that all students, regardless of gender, be provided
with equal opportunity to participate in athletic programs and that
schools “effectively accommodate” the interests and abilities of both
sexes.4
Almost fifty years following the ratification of Title IX, the
COVID-19 pandemic has exposed flagrant issues of noncompliance
with Title IX amongst collegiate sport programs.5 By October of
2020, “twenty-six colleges and universities, from Stanford to
Dartmouth College, [had] cut more than 90 sports programs.”6
1. 20 U.S.C.A § 1681(a) (West 1972) (prohibiting discrimination based on
sex under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).
2. See Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (S.D. Iowa
2020) (stating Title IX protections apply to athletic opportunities provided by educational institutions receiving federal funding), appeal dismissed, No. 21-1203, 2021
WL 3174982 (8th Cir. Feb. 26, 2021).
3. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2020) (extending Title IX protections to include
protections in athletic programs).
4. See id. (providing courts with standard for educational institutions to show
Title IX compliance).
5. See Molly Hensley-Clancy, Colleges Cut Sports to Save Money Amid the Pandemic.
Then Came the Title IX Lawsuits, WASH. POST (Mar. 25, 2021), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/03/25/college-sports-cuts-title-ix/ [https:/
/perma.cc/62WX-VHR6] (documenting influx of Title IX litigation following several universities cutting female sports teams due to coronavirus-related budget
cuts).
6. See Matt Marshall et al., College Sports Cuts in the Wake of Covid-19 are Clouding
the Future of Olympics Participation, NBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2020), https://
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From the period between March 2020 and November 2020, more
than three hundred and fifty National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) sport programs were cut.7 In the wake of these cuts
to sports programs, several high profile Title IX lawsuits were filed
or threatened by students seeking to force their schools to reinstate
their eliminated sports programs.8 In some instances, universities
reversed course and reinstated athletic teams following threats of
class-action lawsuits alleging Title IX violations by the school.9 In
other instances, these lawsuits proceeded and courts had to address
whether it was appropriate to issue preliminary injunctions reinstating cut sports programs.10
This Comment evaluates these lawsuits and the ramifications of
coronavirus-related sports cuts to Title IX compliance.11 In Section
II, this Comment provides a brief history of Title IX and the threeprong test created to analyze Title IX compliance by educational
institutions.12 Section III analyzes the effectiveness of recent Title
IX settlement agreements and the ramifications that COVID-19 related sports cuts have on the future of collegiate athletics’ Title IX
compliance.13

www.nbcnews.com/news/sports/college-sports-cuts-wake-covid-19-are-clouding-future-certain-n1243803 [https://perma.cc/UE3W-NU2N] (describing widespread
sport cuts made by universities in wake of COVID-19 pandemic and repercussions
these cuts will have on United States Olympic teams).
7. See Aishwarya Kumar, The Heartbreaking Reality — and Staggering Numbers —
of NCAA Teams Cut During the Pandemic, ESPN (Nov. 6, 2020), https://
www.espn.com/olympics/story/_/id/30116720/the-heartbreaking-reality-staggering-numbers-ncaa-teams-cut-pandemic [https://perma.cc/8DBF-NDV8] (detailing
staggering number of coronavirus-related cuts to collegiate sport programs).
8. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (discussing several Title IX suits filed by
female athletes whose teams were cut following COVID-19 budget cuts).
9. See Daniela Allee, Dartmouth College Reinstates Five Previously Cut Sports Teams,
After Threat of Lawsuit, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.nhpr.org/nhnews/2021-01-29/dartmouth-college-reinstates-five-previously-cut-sports-teams-after-threat-of-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/V4YU-4J6E] (detailing Dartmouth College’s decision to reinstate five athletic teams that were cut in July 2020, following
threats of class-action lawsuits alleging Dartmouth was violating Title IX).
10. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (discussing Title IX litigation started by
COVID-19 budget cuts that led to successful attempts for preliminary injunctions).
11. For further discussion of recent Title IX lawsuits, see infra notes 78-171
and accompanying text.
12. For further discussion of Title IX history and its relation to collegiate athletics, see infra notes 14–162 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the effectiveness of recent Title IX settlement
agreements and the ramifications of coronavirus-related sport cuts, see infra notes
163–229 and accompanying text.
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LITIGATION BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has recognized that “our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”14 As the women’s civil rights movement gained momentum in the 1960s and
1970s, focus shifted to inequalities in education that inhibited the
progress of women.15 The first legislative step toward the enactment of Title IX occurred when Representative Edith Green first
introduced an education bill with provisions regarding sex equity
and held hearings devoted to the topic.16 Congressional activity on
the issue continued to increase and several education bills were introduced that included anti-sex discrimination proposals.17 Eventually a House-Senate Conference Committee reviewed all of the
proposals and created the final legislation that became Title IX.18
On June 23, 1972, Congress passed Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, which barred sex discrimination in education programs and activities by any institution that receives federal
financial assistance.19 At this time, Congress had two main objectives in effectuating Title IX: (1) to avoid the use of federal resources to support discrimination in education based on sex, and
(2) to provide citizens with protection against such discriminatory
practices.20
14. See United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 517 (1996) (holding Commonwealth of Virginia failed to show exceedingly persuasive justification for excluding
women from citizen-soldier program offered at Virginia’s military college in violation of equal protection).
15. See Iram Valentin, Title IX: A Brief History, 2 HOLY CROSS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
123, 124 (1997) (tracing Title IX’s legislative origins to Executive Order 11246,
which prohibited federal contractors from discriminating against employees, and
noting Title IX was later amended to include discrimination based on sex).
16. See id. (explaining Representative Edith Green’s introduction of higher
education bill with provisions regarding sex equality, plus subsequent hearings devoted to topic).
17. See id. (detailing increase of educational bills including anti-sex discrimination proposals).
18. See id. (explaining months of debate culminating in agreed legislation
protecting against sex discrimination, which became Title IX).
19. See 20 U.S.C.A § 1681(a) (West 1972) (stating “[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
20. See Ann K Wooster, Annotation, Sex Discrimination in Public Education Under
Title IX—Supreme Court Cases, 158 A.L.R. Fed. 563, §2 (1999) (citing Cannon v.
Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)) (“Title IX, like its model Title VI,
sought to accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives.
First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection
against those practices. Both of these purposes were repeatedly identified in the
debates on the two statutes.”).
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Section II(A) below discusses Title IX’s extension to collegiate
athletics.21 Subsection II(B) evaluates the Department of Education’s three-pronged analysis for determining compliance.22 Sections II(C)–(G) address the injunctive relief standard and how
courts in varying jurisdictions have applied it in recent Title IX
lawsuits.23
A. Applying Title IX to Athletics
At the time Congress passed Title IX, “the breadth of Title IX’s
application to athletics was unclear and the subject of some debate.”24 Through Section 1687, Congress amended Title IX by providing further interpretation of the term “program or activity.”25
Section 1687 clarified that the phrase “program or activity” in Title
IX extended to all the operations of “a college, university, or other
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education.”26 Further, it was promulgated by the Department of Education that “[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against” within
athletic programs.27 This provision of the Code of Federal Regulations further orders that there be equal opportunity for members of
all sexes in available athletic opportunities.28
Throughout the years, Title IX’s application to athletics has developed through various regulations and court decisions.29 In gen21. For further discussion of the application of Title IX to athletics, see infra
notes 24–36 and accompanying text.
22. Title IX compliance analysis, see infra notes 37–72 and accompanying
text.
23. For further discussion of the injunctive relief standard and its application
by courts in recent Title IX suits, see infra notes 73–162 and accompanying text.
24. See JANET P. JUDGE, TITLE IX AND ITS APPLICATION TO INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS, 11 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., Inc., 2012) (describing application
of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics).
25. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1687 (West 2016) (defining, in relevant part, “program
or activity” as “all the operations of. . .a college, university, or other postsecondary
institution, or a public system of higher education”).
26. See id. § 1687(2)(A) (defining “program or activity” to mean “a college,
university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher
education”).
27. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2020) (prohibiting exclusion on basis of sex
from participation in “any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural
athletics”).
28. See id. § 106.41(c) (providing equal athletic opportunity for members of
all sexes while listing factors to consider in determining whether equal opportunities have been provided, such as equipment, scheduling, travel allowance, coaching opportunities, availability of locker rooms, and competitive facilities).
29. See Paul Anderson & Barbara Osborne, A Historical Review of Title IX Litigation, 18 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 127, 127 (2008) (detailing history of Title IX litiga-
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eral, there are three basic parts of Title IX as it applies to athletics:
(1) equal opportunity to participate in sports, (2) proportionality in
athletic scholarships awarded to all athletes, and (3) equal treatment in athletics programs.30 Within these three parts, Title IX
claims of sex discrimination in athletics fall into two broad categories based on Section 106.41(c) of the Code of Federal Regulations
addressed above.31 First, claims can focus on effective accommodation claims.32 Second, Title IX discrimination claims in athletics
can focus on disparate treatment.33
The law governing effective accommodation claims is covered
by a series of published policy interpretations.34 In 1979, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare published “Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics.”35 This policy interpretation articulated the three ways in which a school’s compliance with Title
IX’s effective accommodation requirement may be assessed:
1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or
tion in addition to changes made to judicial review on Title IX claims, stating
“[Title IX’s] application to athletics has come through various regulations, interpretations, and clarifications as well as numerous lawsuits brought by individuals
and groups who have felt excluded, denied or discriminated against within these
educational programs and activities”).
30. See Title IX Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/inclusion/title-ix-frequently-asked-questions [https://perma.cc/5KEN-GAE6] (last visited Apr. 3, 2022) (addressing frequently asked questions regarding Title IX in sports).
31. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 FED. CIV. RTS. ACTS § 8:29 (3d ed. 2022) (detailing specific Title IX applications to athletics).
32. See § 106.41(c)(1) (stating one factor in determining whether equal opportunities are available is “[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes”).
33. See §§ 106.41(c)(2)–(10) (listing other factors for determining whether
equal opportunities are available: “(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time; (4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5)
Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; (9)
Provision of housing and dining facilities and services; (10) Publicity”).
34. See Judge, supra note 24 (explaining increased Title IX complaints led to
published additional guidance for policy interpretation).
35. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 (Dec. 11, 1979) [hereinafter Policy
Interpretation] (clarifying Title IX’s application in athletic context).
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(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive
to the developing interest and abilities of the members of
that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have
been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.36
B. Understanding the Three-Prong Test
In determining whether to grant injunctive relief, courts must
address the question of whether an educational institution is effectively accommodating the interests and abilities of both sexes in
compliance with Title IX.37 In order for an institution to show that
it is effectively accommodating athletes of both sexes, and therefore
maintain compliance with Title IX, the Department of Education’s
Office of Civil Rights requires athletic programs to meet a threeprong test.38 In general, the three-prong test assesses whether an
institution is effectively accommodating the athletic interests and
abilities of all students regardless of their gender.39
First, institutions are in compliance with Title IX if opportunities for male and female students are provided in “numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments.”40 Second,
if members of one sex are underrepresented, an institution can
show compliance by showing a “history and continuing practice of
program expansion” that is responsive to the interests and abilities
36. See id. (detailing three ways schools’ compliance with Title IX’s effective
accommodation requirement may be assessed).
37. See Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1089 (S.D. Iowa
2020) (detailing preliminary injunction standard courts apply in Title IX cases).
38. See id. (introducing three-prong test for Title IX cases).
39. See Berndsen v. N.D. Univ. Sys., 7 F.4th 782, 793 (8th Cir. 2021) (explaining general purpose of three-part test that was created by Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights to examine Title IX compliance within educational
settings).
40. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71413 (providing regulatory guidance for Title IX compliance).
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of the underrepresented sex.41 Third, where an institution cannot
meet the burden of the first two prongs, it can show compliance if it
can demonstrate that the interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex have been fully accommodated by the present
program.42
In 1996, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights published further clarification of the three-prong test listed
above.43 The clarification memorandum elaborated that the threepart test furnishes an institution with three individual avenues to
provide nondiscriminatory athletic opportunities.44 This memorandum clarified that institutions only need to meet one of the three
prongs to prove compliance with Title IX.45 With regard to the first
prong, showing substantial proportionality, the memorandum clarified that exact proportionality satisfies this criteria.46 The memorandum further stated that exact proportionality may not always be
achieved, and proportionality should depend on the institution’s
specific circumstances and size of its athletic program.47
In 2003, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights published yet another clarification on the three-prong test.48
The 2003 clarification reiterated that the three-pronged test is the
41. See id. (“Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex.”).
42. See id. (“Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program.”).
43. See Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/clarific.html [https://
perma.cc/52VY-M9GT] (clarifying use of Title IX in intercollegiate athletics
policy).
44. See id. (confirming three possible avenues for compliance with Title IX).
45. See id. (establishing institutions need to comply with only one part of
three-part test to provide nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals regardless of sex).
46. See id. (stating one way to achieve proportionality is if there is “no difference between the participation rate in an institution’s intercollegiate athletic program and its full-time undergraduate student enrollment”).
47. See id. (clarifying circumstances will exist when institutions are unable to
achieve exact proportionality due to natural fluctuations in enrollment or participation rates).
48. See Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html [https://perma.cc/7RPB-K8H3] (providing further clarification plus guidance regarding three-prong standard for Title
IX compliance).
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standard for determining whether an educational institution has accommodated the interests of all students, and that an institution
may choose which of the three criteria it intends to pursue.49 When
evaluating Title IX claims, courts must use the three-prong analysis
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights controlling deference.50
Courts have differed in their opinions as to exactly what burden students must meet to show that institutions fail to comply with
the three-pronged analysis.51 In Ohlensehlen v. University of Iowa,52
the court granted injunctive relief after finding that Plaintiffs could
establish that the University of Iowa did not effectively accommodate female athletes.53 Conversely, in Balow v. Michigan State University,54 the court denied injunctive relief after finding that Plaintiffs
were not likely to show that Michigan State University (“MSU”) was
noncompliant with Title IX.55
1. Prong One: Substantial Proportionality
The first prong of the three-prong test states that an institution
is in compliance with Title IX when athletic participation opportunities for both male and female students are substantially proportionate to their respective full-time enrollments.56 Courts have
been reluctant to assign an exact percentage difference that would
49. See id. (affirming three-part test as standard for reviewing Title IX
compliance).
50. See Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1089 n.1 (S.D. Iowa
2020) (citing Chalenor v. Univ. N. Dakota, 291 F.3d 1024, 1047 (8th Cir. 2002))
(stating court applies deference to U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Civil
Rights).
51. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (granting preliminary injunction);
see also Balow v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:21-CV-44, 2021 WL 650712, at *1 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 19, 2021) (denying preliminary injunction and finding Plaintiffs failed
to show substantial likelihood of success given “MSU’s participation gap appears to
be lower than 2%. Plaintiffs have not cited, and the Court is not aware, of any case
where a gap lower than 2% failed to satisfy the test for substantial
proportionality”).
52. Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1089 (detailing Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction relating to University of Iowa’s cuts to women’s athletic teams).
53. See id. at 1088 (granting injunctive relief after holding Plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on Title IX claims).
54. See Balow, 2021 WL 650712, at *1 (analyzing plaintiffs request for injunctive relief in Title IX case).
55. See id. (denying injunctive relief in Title IX case because Plaintiffs failed to
show they were likely to succeed on Title IX claims).
56. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (interpreting
Title IX’s application to intercollegiate athletics).
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meet or fail to meet the substantial proportionality requirement.57
If an institution is able to show substantially proportionate athletic
participation opportunities, the institution has satisfied a “safe harbor” in establishing compliance with Title IX.58 As the court in Cohen v. Brown University59 stated, “a university which does not wish to
engage in extensive compliance analysis may stay on the sunny side
of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student
body and its athletic lineup.”60
2. Prong Two: Program Expansion
When an institution is unable to satisfy prong one of the test, it
can establish Title IX compliance by showing a history and continuing practice in developing athletic programs to the interests and
abilities of the discriminated sex.61 The second prong, as well as
the third prong, recognize that there are circumstances where proportionality is unattainable.62 An institution may satisfy the second
prong by showing that it historically increased the percentage of
opportunities for the underrepresented sex compared to the other
sex, and that the expansion is continuing.63
According to the U.S. Department of Education’s guidance,
this prong requires a review of the entire history of the athletic program with a focus on the participation opportunities provided to
the underrepresented group.64 In assessing whether an institution
57. See Judge, supra note 24 (discussing Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, where
court stated 2% would meet test but disparity of 3.62% did not); see also Biediger v.
Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 111 (D. Conn. 2010) (“A 3.62 percent difference represents, in strictly numerical terms, a borderline case of disproportionate
athletic opportunities for women.”).
58. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (reiterating first prong of threeprong test promulgated by U.S. Department of Education).
59. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing
Title IX noncompliance claims).
60. See id. (reiterating compliance with prong one leads to safe harbor for
Title IX compliance).
61. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (providing clarification on Title IX as applied to intercollegiate athletics).
62. See Cohen, 991 F.2d at 898 (detailing reason U.S. Department of Education
provided prong two and prong three of three-prong test for institutions where
substantial proportionality is not feasible or attainable).
63. See Judge, supra note 24 (evaluating application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics).
64. See Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. (Jan. 16, 1996), http://www.ed.gov/ocr/docs/clarific.html [https://
perma.cc/VM9D-4M8M] (stating second prong analysis depends on “whether past
actions of the institution have expanded participation opportunities for the underrepresented sex in a manner that was demonstrably responsive to their developing
interests and abilities. Developing interests include interests that already exist at
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has a history of program expansion, evidence courts consider includes the institution’s record of adding intercollegiate teams or
upgrading teams to intercollegiate status for the underrepresented
sex.65 Further, while determining whether an institution has a continuing practice of program expansion, evidence courts consider is
the institution’s implementation of a program expansion plan and
procedures for requesting additional sport teams.66 Both showings
would be further bolstered by introducing evidence that the institution makes an effort to collect assessments of interests to take action
in response to those results.67 If an institution can show that it has
a history and continuing practice of expanding its athletic program
in response to the developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex, it will be considered compliant with Title IX.68
the institution. There are no fixed intervals of time within which an institution
must have added participation opportunities. Neither is a particular number of
sports dispositive. Rather, the focus is on whether the program expansion was responsive to developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex”).
65. See id. (listing several factors indicating history of programs expansion including “an institution’s record of adding intercollegiate teams, or upgrading
teams to intercollegiate status, for the underrepresented sex; an institution’s record of increasing the numbers of participants in intercollegiate athletics who are
members of the underrepresented sex; and an institution’s affirmative responses
to requests by students or others for addition or elevation of sports”).
66. See id. (listing factors indicating continuing practice of program expansion: “an institution’s current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or
procedure for requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of club or
intramural teams) and the effective communication of the policy or procedure to
students; and an institution’s current implementation of a plan of program expansion that is responsive to developing interests and abilities”).
67. See id. (“[The Office of Civil Rights] would also find persuasive an institution’s efforts to monitor developing interests and abilities of the underrepresented
sex, for example, by conducting periodic nondiscriminatory assessments of developing interests and abilities and taking timely actions in response to the results.”).
68. See id. (analyzing several scenarios intended to illustrate prong-two principles—for example “[i]n the mid-1970s, Institution E established five teams for women. In 1979 it added a women’s varsity team. In 1984 it upgraded a women’s club
sport with twenty-five participants to varsity team status. At that time it eliminated a
women’s varsity team that had eight members. In 1987 and 1989 Institution E added women’s varsity teams that were identified by a significant number of its enrolled and incoming female students when surveyed regarding their athletic
interests and abilities. During this time it also increased the size of an existing
women’s team to provide opportunities for women who expressed interest in playing that sport. Within the past year, it added a women’s varsity team based on a
nationwide survey of the most popular girls high school teams. Based on the addition of these teams, the percentage of women participating in varsity athletics at
the institution has increased. Based on these facts, OCR would find Institution E in
compliance with part two because it has a history of program expansion and the
elimination of the team in 1984 took place within the context of continuing program expansion for the underrepresented sex that is responsive to their developing interests”).
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3. Prong Three: Effective Accommodation
Finally, prong three of the test allows an institution to remain
in compliance with Title IX if, despite being unable to show substantial proportionality or program expansion, it can establish that
the interests and abilities of the members of the underrepresented
sex are fully accommodated by the current athletic program.69 To
satisfy this prong, the institution bears the burden of showing that
the school took reasonable steps to ensure that the interest and
abilities of the underrepresented group were met.70 If the institution has shown reasonable attempts to ensure that the interests and
abilities of students were met, the institution will be in compliance
with Title IX despite gaps in gender participation.71 This prong will
require more than surveys standing alone, but rather, the use of
multiple tools implemented at a constant rate to provide accurate
insight into student interest.72
C. COVID-19 Cuts and Requests for Preliminary Injunctions
In response to budget constraints following the COVID-19 pandemic, several colleges made cuts to their athletic programs.73 In
an attempt to reinstate their sport teams, women affected by the
cuts began filing Title IX lawsuits and requesting courts to enter
injunctions forcing schools to reinstate their teams.74 These law69. See Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71413 (Dec. 11, 1979) (stating compliance can be assessed through showing “that the interests and abilities of the
members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program”).
70. See Judge, supra note 24 (discussing third prong of Title IX compliance
analysis).
71. See id. (explaining provision excusing noncompliance if institution can
establish reasonable attempts to ensure interests and abilities of students were
met).
72. See at 137-38 (explaining “a school should not hope to satisfy the Third
Part by merely providing statistics purporting to show a lack of interest in the area
traditionally recruited by the school” given Cohen Court’s fear that “there exists the
danger that, rather than providing a true measure of women’s interest in sports,
statistical evidence purporting to reflect women’s interest instead provides only a
measure of the very discrimination that is and has been the basis for women’s lack
of opportunity to participate in sports. Prong three requires some kind of evidence
of interest in athletics, and the Title IX framework permits the use of statistical
evidence in assessing the level of interest in sports. Nevertheless, to allow a numbers-based lack-of-interest defense to become the instrument of further discrimination against the underrepresented gender would pervert the remedial purpose of
Title IX” (footnote omitted)).
73. See Marshall, supra note 6 (detailing sport cuts made following COVID-19
pandemic).
74. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (discussing Title IX lawsuits filed in response to cut sports programs).
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suits argue that institutions were already in violation of Title IX due
to disproportionate representation of both sexes in athletic offerings, and that continued team cuts furthered that imbalance, or at
least kept it disproportionate.75 In some cases, the threat of lawsuits caused institutions to reverse course and reinstate cut teams.76
Other lawsuits proceeded, and courts issued differing opinions on
whether the standards for an injunction were met.77
To remedy these cuts, many plaintiffs sought injunctive relief,
which the court in Ohlensehlen stated, “is an extraordinary remedy
that is not issued lightly.”78 In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction for a Title IX claim, courts generally weigh four
factors: (1) plaintiff’s probability of success on the merits of their
Title IX claim; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiffs absent relief; (3) the balance of weighing the harm suffered by plaintiff against the harm suffered by the institution resulting from an
injunction; and (4) the public interest.79 These factors are not a
rigid formula and instead require courts to weigh each of the particular circumstances of each case.80 Of these factors, no one factor
is determinative and plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that
these factors weigh in favor of granting an injunction.81
75. See id. (detailing Plaintiffs’ decisions to file Title IX lawsuits given historical and continued noncompliance).
76. See Chris Burt, Title IX: Dartmouth Reverses Course, Reinstates Women’s Athletic
Teams, U NIV . B US . (Feb. 1, 2021), https://universitybusiness.com/title-ixdartmouth-reverses-course-reinstates-womens-athletic-teams/ [https://perma.cc/
N2S7-SRPN] (writing enrollment of women at Dartmouth College was 49.06%
while percentage of women athletes was 46.23%).
77. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (discussing several Title IX suits filed by
female athletes whose teams had been cut following COVID-19 budget cuts).
78. See Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1093 (S.D. Iowa
2020) (discussing high standard of preliminary injunctions showings that must be
met for such extreme remedy).
79. See Anna Majestro, Preparing for and Obtaining Preliminary Injunctive Relief,
A.B.A. (June 4, 2018) https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/practice/2018/preliminary-injuction-relief/ [https://
perma.cc/9ND7-3BES] (indicating while tests for obtaining injunctive relief may
vary slightly across jurisdictions, generally four factors are weighed in determining
whether injunctive relief is appropriate in given case: “(1) that he or she is likely to
succeed on the merits of his claims; (2) that he or she is likely to suffer irreparable
harm without preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities between the parties
support an injunction; and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.”).
80. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1094 (stating balancing of factors requires court to “ ‘flexibly weigh the case’s particular circumstances to determine
“whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that justice requires the
court to intervene to preserve the status quo until the merits are determined”’ ”
(citing Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Lab., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir.
1987))).
81. See id. (stating burden of proof shifts to plaintiffs in preliminary injunction requests).
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D. Touchdown in Ohlensehlen for Plaintiffs
Ohlensehlen is a case that stems from COVID-19 related athletic
cuts where the court granted injunctive relief to Plaintiffs.82 The
Defendant, the University of Iowa, is a public institution of higher
education in the State of Iowa.83 Therefore, the University receives
federal funding and is subject to Title IX.84 In August 2020, citing
the financial burdens following the COVID-19 pandemic, the University announced that the school’s ability to support athletic programs was no longer viable.85 In turn, the University made the
decision to eliminate the women’s swimming and diving team.86 In
December 2020, Plaintiffs, members of the women’s swimming and
diving team, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that the University
would be noncompliant with Title IX and requested an injunction
prohibiting the University from eliminating the women’s swimming
and diving team.87
The court started by evaluating the first injunctive relief factor,
finding that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in a Title IX action.88
In evaluating this factor, the court applied a “fair-chance” standard,
meaning that Plaintiffs’ burden of proof was that they had a fair
chance in succeeding on the merits of their Title IX claims.89 The
question before the court then became “whether the University of
Iowa will comply with Title IX under Prong One of the Three-Part
Test in 2021–22, after eliminating women’s swimming and diving
teams alongside three men’s teams.”90
Prong one of the three-prong test is fact-specific and requires
that institutions provide athletic participation opportunities sub82. See id. at 1090 (finding University announced cuts to sports programs citing financial constraints imposed by COVID-19 pandemic fallout).
83. See Institutions, BD. OF REGENTS, https://www.iowaregents.edu/institutions [https://perma.cc/6G66-T6FJ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2022) (reinforcing Title
IX is applicable because as state institution, University of Iowa receives federal
funding).
84. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1090 (reiterating Title IX’s application
to University of Iowa given its receipt of federal funds).
85. See id. at 1092 (detailing University of Iowa’s decision to cut sport programs due to COVID-19 pandemic’s effect on finances).
86. See id. at 1088 (explaining University of Iowa’s swimming and diving team
was one of sport programs cut due to budgetary concerns).
87. See id. (describing Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunction based on
University of Iowa’s noncompliance with Title IX).
88. See id. at 1094 (reiterating first prong of three-prong standard).
89. See id. (explaining application of burden of proof on plaintiffs to prove
likelihood of success on Title IX claims).
90. See id. (analyzing questions court needs to address in approaching Title IX
noncompliance claim, turning first to merits of allegations, then to three-prong
analysis).
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stantially proportional between sexes.91 This prong is usually met
“when the number of opportunities that would be required to
achieve proportionality would not be sufficient to sustain a viable
team.”92 In Ohlensehlen, the court relied on Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr.
Lopiano’s report, which used information provided under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (“EADA”).93 The court found that
EADA reports always overstate women’s participation in intercollegiate athletics, and therefore, despite the fact that they were not
absolutely accurate projections, they would be sufficient to evaluate
Title IX compliance.94
The most recent EADA data available to the court showed that
there was a 2.8% disparity that reflected forty-seven fewer athletic
opportunities for women than there would be if participation were
substantially proportionate to their representation on campus.95
Further, Dr. Lopiano’s testimony revealed that the University had a
more consistent and persistent gender gap greater than she had
ever seen before.96 Relying on this data, the court held that Plaintiffs demonstrated a fair chance that the University does not pro-

91. See id. (categorizing first prong as “fact-specific inquiry” usually met “when
the number of opportunities that would be required to achieve proportionality
would not be sufficient to sustain a viable team, i.e., a team for which there is a
sufficient number of interested and able students and enough available competition to sustain an intercollegiate team”).
92. See Further Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance Regarding Title IX Compliance, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 11, 2003), http://www.ed.gov/about/
offices/list/ocr/title9guidanceFinal.html [https://perma.cc/4KEQ-C9NJ] (detailing methods of compliance with Title IX encouraging “schools to take advantage
of [the three-prong test’s] flexibility, and to consider which of the three prongs
best suits their individual situations”); see also Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1095
(citing Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ., 196 F. Supp. 3d 963, 974 (D. Minn.
2016))(“The most recent data from the University’s 2018–19 EADA report discloses a 49.2%-50.8% male-female student athlete ratio despite a student body consisting of only 46.4% men and 53.6% women—a 2.8% disparity that reflects 47
fewer athletic opportunities for women than there would be if participation were
substantially proportionate to their representation on campus”).
93. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1095 (detailing Plaintiffs’ expert testimony finding “[p]ublic data created by the University through its website rosters
reflects a participation gap of 92 athletic opportunities for last year (2019–20), and
for the current academic year (2020-21), anticipates an athlete gap of 141. And
according to the expert testimony of Dr. Lopiano, the female participation gap
reflected in this data is considerably understated”).
94. See id. at 1099 (analyzing controversy in applying Plaintiffs’ expert’s
methods).
95. See id. at 1094 (indicating lack of proportionality in athletic
opportunities).
96. See id. at 1098 (concluding gender gap was at least 2.8%).
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vide female students with athletic opportunities substantially
proportional to their enrollment.97
The court then held that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable
harm if injunctive relief were denied.98 The court found that the
harm faced by Plaintiffs is “not only irreparable” but “it is existential.”99 The court found that Plaintiffs would suffer harm in their
athletic development, financial positions, and emotional well-being
absent relief.100
Next, the court evaluated the balance of equities and held that
the setbacks suffered by Defendant do not outweigh those suffered
by Plaintiffs.101 The court acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic caused financial strain on the University.102 However, the
court reiterated that financial hardship was not a defense to sex
discrimination.103 Finally, the court considered the public’s interest in the case.104 The court held that since the University is a public institution that is funded by public money, the public has an
interest in the University refraining from discrimination on the basis of sex.105 Weighing all of the above factors, the court granted
injunctive relief to Plaintiffs and enjoined the University from eliminating the women’s swimming and diving teams or any women’s
athletic team.106
E. Same Questions, Different Outcome in Balow
While the court in Balow v. Michigan State University faced a similar issue to the court in Ohlensehlen, it denied Plaintiffs’ request for
97. See id. at 1101 (finding Plaintiffs’ expert had shown gender gap in athletic
opportunities provided to women).
98. See id. at 1101–02 (holding Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if injunction was not granted).
99. See id. at 1102 (discussing existential harm Plaintiffs would endure due to
importance of collegiate sport programs for young athletes).
100. See id. (holding Plaintiffs would face irreparable harm in athletic, professional, financial, and emotional well-being if injunction was not granted).
101. See id. at 1104 (turning to next factor in determining whether Plaintiffs
meets preliminary injunction standard by weighing costs associated on both sides
against injunction along with expected effect of such costs).
102. See id. (analyzing cost associated with reinstating team on University).
103. See id. (stating ultimately, financial hardship is never defense to Title IX
noncompliance (citing Mayerova v. E. Mich. Univ., 346 F. Supp. 3d 983, 998 (E.D.
Mich. 2018)).
104. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1104 (turning to fourth factor in evaluating whether burden of showing need for preliminary injunction was met).
105. See id. (finding University’s public status implied more of burden to
weigh public interest).
106. See id. at 1106 (granting injunctive relief for Plaintiffs).
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injunctive relief.107 MSU announced in October of 2020 that due
to COVID-19 related budget constraints, it would discontinue its
men’s and women’s swimming and diving teams.108 Plaintiffs,
members of the women’s swimming and diving team, claimed that
MSU is in violation of Title IX and the elimination of their team
would exacerbate the problem.109 Accordingly, like the plaintiffs in
Ohlensehlen, Plaintiffs here requested a preliminary injunction requiring MSU to maintain the women’s swimming and diving
team.110
Weighing the same factors that the Ohlensehlen court did in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, the Balow court found that
Plaintiffs failed at the first factor regarding likelihood of success.111
This difference in outcome, however, is mostly attributable to the
Balow court’s heightened standard of review.112 The court specifically declined to follow the standard applied by the Ohlensehlen
court in evaluating the level of likelihood a plaintiff must show to
succeed on the merits of a Title IX case.113 The court stated that
unlike courts in the Eighth Circuit, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan applies a higher standard.114
This standard requires showing that the Plaintiffs have more than a
“fair-chance” of prevailing on their Title IX claim but that they are
“likely to” prevail.115
Interestingly, Plaintiffs in Balow relied on a report and testimony of Dr. Lopiano, who is the same expert in the Ohlensehlen
107. See Balow v. Mich. St. Univ., No. 1:21-CV-44, 2021 WL 650712, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2021) (denying injunctive relief to Plaintiffs, who sued following dissolution of athletic team due to COVID-19 budget cuts).
108. See id. (detailing events leading to announcement of cut athletic programs at MSU).
109. See id. (explaining Plaintiffs’ position regarding need for injunctive
relief).
110. See id. at *1 (“Plaintiffs believe that the elimination of their team would
exacerbate this problem; accordingly, they have asked the Court for a preliminary
injunction requiring MSU to maintain its varsity women’s swimming and diving
team for the duration of this lawsuit.”).
111. See id. at *4 (“Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction falters on the first, and
most important, factor. Plaintiffs have not shown a strong or substantial likelihood
of success on the merits of their claim.”).
112. See id. at *5 (analyzing Plaintiffs’ request under heightened likely-to-prevail standard).
113. See id. (addressing Plaintiffs’ reliance on Ohlensehlen while rejecting
Eighth Circuit’s evaluation for preliminary injunctions under fair-chance
standard).
114. See id. (abiding by Sixth Circuit’s established heightened likely-to-prevail
standard).
115. See id. (applying heightened standard but recognizing duty to balance
Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success against other factors).
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case.116 Here, however, the court held that Dr. Lopiano’s report
and projection of the gender gap had several shortcomings and
flaws.117 Even still, the court found that the projections indicated
that MSU was in violation of Title IX.118 Next, the court held that
Plaintiffs met their burden in demonstrating irreparable harm.119
The court next found that an injunction would pose a significant
burden on MSU.120 Finally, the court held that Plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that they are likely to succeed in their claim, and that
there would be no benefit to the public’s interest.121 In accordance
with these findings, the court denied injunctive relief to
Plaintiffs.122
F. Lazor Falls in line with Ohlensehlen
In Lazor v. University of Connecticut123, Plaintiffs moved for a
temporary restraining order enjoining the University of Connecticut (“UConn”) from eliminating the women’s rowing team.124 In
June 2020, UConn announced that due to budget concerns the women’s rowing team would be cut.125 Plaintiffs argued that the decision to eliminate the women’s team violated Title IX and a
temporary restraining order was needed to maintain the status quo
pending judicial resolution.126 The court first clarified that in the
116. See id. at *5–6 (stating Plaintiffs’ reliance on analysis conducted by
Donna Lopiano, who uses publicly available data to offer opinion of institution’s
participation gap).
117. See id. at *7 (“Lopiano’s analysis contains several shortcomings and flaws
that taint her conclusions. First, as she acknowledges, she does not possess the data
necessary to accurately count participant numbers. She is forced to guess the number of participants based on EADA reports that are inconsistent with the definition
of participant under Title IX, and web rosters that she speculates are more in line
with that definition.”).
118. See id. (relying on Lopiano’s analysis of participation gap).
119. See id. at *12 (holding Plaintiff’s met their burden in showing irreparable
harm through discontinuation of team, leading to significant impacts on athletic
experience, ability to compete, and transfer costs).
120. See id. (stating “an injunction would require MSU to allocate significant
resources to the women’s swimming and diving team that MSU could use
elsewhere”).
121. See id. (finding absent showing of succeeding on claim of discrimination
in athletic opportunities, requested injunction would not serve public interests).
122. See id. (denying Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction).
123. Lazor v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:21-CV-583 (SRU), 2021 WL 2138832 (D.
Conn. May 26, 2021).
124. See id. (stating cause of action for Plaintiffs seeking to enjoin Defendants
from eliminating women’s sports teams).
125. See id. (reporting University announced on June 24, 2020 it would cut
women’s rowing, plus two men’s sports teams).
126. See id. (reiterating Plaintiffs’ argument of irreparable harm without injunctive relief and substantial likelihood of success on Title IX claims).
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Second Circuit, the same legal standard governs motions for both
temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.127 To
prevail on a motion for a temporary restraining order, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that she is likely to succeed on the merits, she is
likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief, the balance of equity tips in her favor, and the injunction serves the public
interest.128
The court proceeded to find that Plaintiffs established they
would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief and that
there was a substantial likelihood of success on their Title IX
claim.129 Particularly, the court held the participation gap between
genders in athletic programs was noncompliant with Title IX.130
This gap, the court held, was also not attributable to natural fluctuation in enrollment or drops in female participation and interest.131
Strikingly, the court stated that evidence regarding UConn’s historical data showed that UConn was not, and has not, been compliant
with Title IX requirements since 2008.132 Given gender gaps in athletic opportunities available, the decision to further cut women’s
programs was held to only exacerbate noncompliance by magnifying UConn’s gender disparity in athletic programs.133
In evaluating the other factors required for a temporary restraining order, the court also found in favor of Plaintiffs.134 The
court stated that Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief.135 The balancing of equities also favored Plaintiffs
127. See id. (articulating standard of review applied by Second Circuit in evaluating motions for temporary restraining orders).
128. See id. at *3 (stating standard for movant to prevail on motion for temporary restraining order).
129. See id. at *2 (granting Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order
enjoining Defendants from eliminating women’s sport programs).
130. See id. at *5 (concluding “the participation gap [percentage] is well
above a viable team size even when using the participation gap numbers offered by
UConn for the academic years of 2019–2020 (34.46) or 2020–2021 (20)”).
131. See id. (finding UConn failed to proffer any evidence suggesting natural
fluctuations in enrollment were casting disparity in athletic participation
opportunities).
132. See id. (articulating data suggested UConn experienced participation
gaps disfavoring females every year for past thirteen years).
133. See id. at *6 (concluding cutting women’s rowing would only exacerbate
noncompliance by magnifying Uconn’s disparity in athletic participation
opportunities).
134. See id. at *6–7 (concluding Plaintiffs met burden of showing likelihood
of establishing irreparable harm, balancing of equities in Plaintiffs’ favor, and furthering public interest).
135. See id. at *6 (determining Plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable harm
since many athletes train vigorously to compete at collegiate levels, while noting
athletes would lose long-sought opportunities to compete at this level).
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as UConn failed to describe any harm that it would face in sustaining the women’s athletic teams.136 Finally, the court held that
the public’s interest in guaranteeing Plaintiffs’ civil rights as guaranteed under Title IX, favored Plaintiffs.137 Finding that Plaintiffs
met their burden for a temporary restraining order, the court ordered UConn to reinstate eliminated women’s athletic teams.138
G. First Circuit Declares Title IX Compliance Victory
On October 27, 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit upheld a revised settlement agreement between
Brown University and student-athletes in a landmark Title IX compliance case, Cohen v. Brown University.139 The approved settlement
comes after nearly three decades of Title IX legal proceedings.140
The litigation between Brown University and student-athletes began
in 1991, when Brown University downgraded four women’s athletic
teams from fully varsity status to intercollegiate club status.141 Several members of the cut women’s teams initiated suit against Brown
University under Title IX claiming that the University did not effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of both sexes.142 At
that time, the district court certified a class of all present and future
Brown University female students who participate in intercollegiate
athletics funded by Brown University.143 This original class of students, all of whom have graduated, remain class representatives
today.144
136. See id. at *8 (finding no harm sustained by UConn while acknowledging
negative effect on students such as team members transferring, coaches securing
other positions, and ending recruitment efforts).
137. See id. (determining public interest favors institutional compliance with
federal law).
138. See id. at *8 (concluding Plaintiffs prevailed on burden of proving irreparable harm plus substantial likelihood of success on merits).
139. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 21-1032, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32209, at
*34 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2021) (upholding Brown University’s settlement agreement
with student-athletes while rejecting objections raised by class members).
140. See id. at *4 (detailing historical roots of preceding starting in 1990s).
141. See id. (explaining initiation of suit when several women’s volleyball and
gymnastics teams sued Brown University for downgrading women’s volleyball and
women’s gymnastics (alongside men’s golf and water polo) from full varsity status
to intercollegiate club status).
142. See id. (discussing basis for Title IX suit).
143. See id. at *4–5 (clarifying district court’s decision to certify class of “all
present and future Brown University women students and potential students who
participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown”).
144. See id. at *5 (describing class representatives as women student-athletes
then enrolled at Brown University, all of whom have graduated, save for two students who dropped out).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2022

19

Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2022], Art. 5

382

JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 29: p. 363

In 1992, the district court entered a preliminary injunction in
favor of the student-athletes and held a trial on the merits.145 After
the trial, the court ruled that Brown violated Title IX and ordered it
to submit a compliance plan.146 In 1998, after the court’s disapproval of Brown’s initial proposal, the parties reached a joint agreement.147 The agreement created a proportion representation
scheme which required Brown to submit annual compliance reports, and created a mechanism for the parties to raise objections
relating to Brown’s compliance thereof.148 This agreement was indefinite in duration.149
This agreement stayed in place for about twenty-two years until
May of 2020, when Brown University announced an initiative to
downgrade five women’s teams and six men’s teams from varsity to
club status.150 The following June, Brown reinstated the varsity status of the men’s track, field, and cross-country teams, excluding any
women’s teams and thereby violating the joint agreement.151 Following mediation, the parties entered into an amended settlement
agreement, which was the agreement brought before the First Circuit.152 The amended settlement agreement expires in 2024 and
holds that Brown University must restore two women’s teams to varsity status, and may not downgrade any women’s varsity team.153
145. See id. at *6 (stating during trial, Brown University settled with Plaintiffs
on claims relating to disparate-funding issues, so what remained were claims of
disparate participation opportunities).
146. See id. at *5 (explaining district court holding Brown University violated
Title IX by failing to provide equal participation opportunities for all genders).
147. See id. at *6 (reporting district court’s disapproval of Brown University’s
initial plan to cut men’s varsity teams as means of leveling playing field as well as
appellate court’s decision to remand finding district court’s denial as wrong).
148. See id. at *6 (describing proportional representation scheme where each
gender of Brown’s athletes must lie within 3.5% or 2.25% of each gender’s respective campus presence, depending on circumstances).
149. See id. at *7 (noting indefinite terms of joint agreement which provided
jurisdiction to district court for both interpretation and compliance enforcement).
150. See id. (describing Brown University’s announcement of “Excellent in
Brown Athletics Initiative” which sought to make Brown’s programs more competitive overall); see also New Initiative to Reshape, Improve Competitiveness in Brown Varsity
and Club Athletics, NEWS FROM BROWN (May 28, 2020), https://www.brown.edu/
news/2020-05-28/athletics-excellence [https://perma.cc/YXT5-22ZK] (discussing
Brown University’s “Excellence in Brown Athletics Initiative”).
151. See Cohen, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32209, at *8 (describing Brown University’s decision to reinstate only men’s sport teams while bowing to intense pressure
and fierce backlash).
152. See id. (explaining despite Brown University’s promise to achieve compliance by making unspecified programmatic modifications, class representatives
sought enforcement of original agreement along with emergency relief).
153. See id. at *9 (noting Brown University chose to restore women’s equestrian team and women’s fencing team to varsity status).
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Further, if Brown elects to make upgrades to any men’s teams to
varsity status, it must also upgrade an equal number of women’s
teams plus two to varsity status.154
After the parties submitted the amended settlement agreement
to the district court for approval, several of Brown’s varsity female
athletes objected to the agreement.155 The objectors argued that
(1) the named representatives were inadequate representatives of
the class and (2) the proposed settlement was not fair, reasonable,
or adequate.156 The district court approved the amended agreement, stating that the number of objectors was small and that the
agreement is representative and reasonable.157
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit agreed and upheld the amended agreement.158 First, the
court held that the named representatives were adequate representatives of the class because the objectors did not show that the interests of the named class conflict with the interests of members of the
class.159 Second, the court held that the agreement was fair as it
conferred demonstrable benefits to Brown’s female athletes.160 In
its conclusion, the First Circuit stated that the settlement reached is
not perfect, but that there is unlikely to be a solution to all the
problems that might arise in Title IX lawsuits.161 Prophetically, the
court ended its opinion by stating that the need for judicial supervision has diminished and the “finish line is in sight.”162
154. See id. (stating terms of amended settlement agreement).
155. See id. (stating twelve members of either Brown’s varsity women’s gymnastics team or its women’s hockey team objected to amended settlement
agreement).
156. See id. at *9 (summarizing Objector’s arguments asserting class representatives could not adequately represent class as whole, and further agreement was
unfair, unreasonable, and inadequate).
157. See id. at *9–10 (declaring number of objectors represents very small
fraction of class members while noting this fact “is in and of itself representative of
the settlement’s reasonableness”).
158. See id. at *35 (affirming judgment of district court).
159. See id. at *20 (declaring class representatives’ interests do not meaningfully conflict with class members, so members together with representatives are
“competent champions of the cause”).
160. See id. at *29–30 (advocating conferred demonstrable benefits to class
such as immediate reinstatement of women’s equestrian and fencing teams, in addition to Brown University’s commitment to not downgrade women’s varsity teams
for life of amended settlement agreement).
161. See id. at *35 (“The settlement reached here, though not perfect, marks a
fitting conclusion to decades of judicial intrusion upon Brown’s home field.”).
162. See id. (referring to district court’s conclusion marking finish line of judicial supervision over Brown University’s Title IX compliance).
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III. MIRAGE OF A FINISH LINE: ANALYZING THE EFFECTIVENESS
TITLE IX SETTLEMENTS AND WHAT COVID-INSPIRED
LITIGATION SHOWS ABOUT THE STATE OF
COLLEGIATE TITLE IX
NONCOMPLIANCE

OF

While the court in Cohen proclaimed that the finish line for
gender equality in collegiate sports is near, the COVID-19 pandemic has uncovered compliance issues rampant within the collegiate sport world.163 Research has shown that about four
hundred and sixty U.S. college teams have dissolved since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020.164 Of those,
roughly fifty have since been reinstated.165 In cases where teams
were reinstated, “sounding the Title IX alarm has been central.”166
While the Cohen court declared sight of a gender equality in sports
finish line, coronavirus-related athletic cuts have flooded Title IX
litigation.167
Although the First Circuit concluded that Brown University’s
amended settlement agreement “made considerable strides” in ensuring gender equality in collegiate athletic programs, the finish
line is far from in sight.168 The chief complaint of the objectors to
the agreement was that the agreement expires in 2024 and that this
end date forfeits the protections of the agreement without commensurate gains for the class.169 The court responded by stating
that there is no realistic prospect that the joint agreement would
163. For further discussion of Brown University’s settlement agreement, see
supra notes 147–162 and accompanying text.
164. See Janet Lorin & Akayla Gardner, How Title IX Helped Save College Sports
Teams Cut During the Pandemic, B L O O M B E R G (Jan. 7, 2022), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-07/how-title-ix-helped-save-collegesports-teams-cut-during-the-pandemic [https://perma.cc/X5VG-4H44] (discussing research gathered by Jason Bryant, president of National Wrestling Media Association, tracking athletic teams following COVID-19 pandemic).
165. See id. (analyzing data showing four hundred sixty teams cut since March
2020, about one hundred forty-five were “casualties of college closures or mergers”
while remaining three hundred twenty cut teams had approximately fifty
reinstated).
166. See id. (acknowledging in some cases, reinstatement occurred when
schools achieved “more solid financial footing,” citing Stanford University’s reinstatements following improvement in investment returns and alumni donations).
167. See id. (describing “flood of athletics work unseen in decades” brought by
COVID-19 pandemic).
168. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., No. 21-1032, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 32209, at
*34 (1st Cir. Oct. 27, 2021) (determining Brown University’s class representatives
made considerable strides in ensuring gender equality in collegiate sport
programs).
169. See id. at *29 (citing objectors’ argument finding August 2024 expiration
date as forfeit of protection for class).
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last forever.170 While it is true that injunctions should not operate
into perpetuity, the agreement struck does not provide female athletes with tangible guarantees of equality beyond 2024.171 The court
itself premises its holding on the fact that the agreement will benefit Brown’s women athletes until 2024.172 It is unclear what Brown
compliance will look like after 2024—however, it is important to
note that the agreement had to be amended because Brown violated the previous agreement, which had an indefinite duration.173
While some argued the amended settlement agreement was a major
victory for gender equality in collegiate sports, others stated the decision was a major disappointment for women’s rights in collegiate
athletics.174
The COVID-19 pandemic coupled with Title IX litigation not
only shed a light on Title IX noncompliance, but also directly led to
real changes in college sports.175 One such example is the ramification of the Ohlensehlen lawsuit on the University of Iowa’s athletics
department.176 Following the court’s granting of a preliminary injunction, the University of Iowa reinstated women’s swimming and
diving.177 On August 24, 2021, the court acknowledged the intention of the parties to enter into a settlement agreement.178 Univer170. See id. at *31 (declaring it was never realistic joint agreement would last
forever, moreover, accepting institutional reform litigation injunctions should not
operate into perpetuity).
171. See id. at *32 (noting objectors’ argument challenging ability of amended
settlement agreement to protect women students matriculating after 2024).
172. See id. at *33 (concluding “all of Brown’s women’s athletes will benefit
from the settlement until 2024”).
173. See id. at *6 (referring to “new era” dawning at Brown University when
initiative “Excellence in Brown Athletics Initiative” led to Brown University violating original agreement).
174. See Hailey Konnath, 1st Circ. Affirms Deal in ‘Landmark’ College Sports Bias
Case, LAW360 (Oct. 27, 2021), https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/6736199f0b0b-4dda-92a5-015f6314367d/?context=1530671 [https://perma.cc/MKK22ZZP] (quoting Robert J. Bonsignore, counsel for class members opposing
amended settlement, stating decision to approve amended agreement is “huge
blow for women’s rights”).
175. See Chris Wener, Title IX Settlement a Catalyst in Launching Iowa Women’s
Wrestling, Barta Says, DAILY IOWAN (Sept. 23, 2021), https://dailyiowan.com/2021/
09/23/title-ix-settlement-a-catalyst-launching-iowa-womens-wrestling-barta-says/
[https://perma.cc/M4Z9-D4KA] (announcing University of Iowa’s decision to create women’s wrestling team starting in 2023–2024 academic year).
176. See id. (reporting announcement of addition of women’s wrestling team
in response to “COVID-19’s impact, along with a Title IX lawsuit settlement from
four women’s swimmers”).
177. See id. (relaying announcement of University of Iowa permanently reinstating women’s swimming and diving team while stalling men’s swimming and
diving until end of 2020–2021 academic year).
178. See Text Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Joint Motion to Stay
Litigation, Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085 (S.D. Iowa 2020)
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sity of Iowa Athletic Director, Gary Barta, stated that the settlement
agreement specifically required the University to add a women’s
sport.179 Therefore, on September 23, 2021, the University of Iowa
announced that the University will sponsor a women’s wrestling
team starting in the 2023-2024 academic year.180 The University’s
Athletic Director attributed this decision directly to the COVID-19
pandemic and the Ohlensehlen litigation.181 COVID-19 and subsequent Title IX litigation in the Ohlensehlen case exposed Title IX
noncompliance, led to the reinstatement of cut sport teams, and
added more female opportunities in sports.182 Prior to these
events, the University of Iowa expressed interest in creating a women’s wrestling team, but took no concrete action in moving forward.183 Therefore, the Ohlensehlen case, a direct consequence of
the COVID-19 pandemic, increased gender equality in sports.184
The immediate impact of COVID-19 and subsequent Title IX
suits is not limited to the University of Iowa.185 In many instances,
the threat of Title IX lawsuits forced reversals of policies and internal reviews of Title IX compliance.186 One such case was in
Dartmouth College.187 In July of 2020, Dartmouth College an(Case No. 3:20-cv-00080), ECF No. 84 (“[G]ranting in part and denying in part . . .
the Joint Motion to Stay Litigation for 60 Days. The Court notes the parties indicate they have reached a settlement of the issues herein. The Court denies the
request to stay proceedings, but given the parties’ notice of settlement, the Court
removes the trial and final pretrial conference from the court’s calendar.”).
179. See Wener, supra note 175 (quoting Athletic Director Barta stating “[a]s
part of the Title IX lawsuit settlement, we agreed to add a women’s sport . . .”).
180. See id. (announcing addition of women’s wrestling team in addition to
providing ten scholarships for inaugural women’s wrestling team, which is expected to reach thirty to thirty-five athletes total).
181. See id. (quoting Athletic Director Barta stating “were it not for COVID we
wouldn’t have cut sports. . . [and w]ere it not for the Title IX lawsuit, I wasn’t ready
to add women’s wrestling yet”).
182. See id. (reporting reinstatement of women’s teams and decision to add
women’s wrestling).
183. See id. (reiterating hope to gain women’s wrestling student-athletes on
campus as early as 2022-23 academic year).
184. See id. (quoting University of Iowa statement “[t]he pandemic led to the
athletic department cutting four sports. . . which brought on the Title IX lawsuit
and subsequent settlement”).
185. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (detailing several Title IX lawsuits initiated following coronavirus-related sport program cuts).
186. See id. (noting several university policy reversals following lawsuit
threats).
187. See Associated Press, Dartmouth Reinstates Five Sports Teams After Title IX
Concerns, ESPN (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
30801372/dartmouth-reinstates-five-sports-title-ix-concerns [https://perma.cc/
Y7AX-ZNFQ] (detailing Dartmouth College’s response to calls for Title IX lawsuits
following cuts to sport programs).
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nounced that it would be making cuts to women’s and men’s athletic teams due to an expected financial deficit caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic.188 This decision sparked condemnation
from athletes and inspired legal action by the women’s swimming
and diving team and women’s golf team.189 Those teams hired an
attorney and subsequently alleged that Dartmouth was noncompliant with Title IX.190 In response, Dartmouth entered into a settlement agreement agreeing to reverse its decision to cut the teams
and conduct a gender equity review of its athletic program.191 The
settlement agreement was an acknowledgement by Dartmouth that
the data their athletics department used to determine Title IX compliance may not have been complete.192 Therefore, threats of Title
IX actions led to the reinstatement of several Dartmouth women’s
athletic teams, to acknowledgement of Title IX noncompliance,
and to reform for gender equality in athletics.193
Threats of Title IX lawsuits had almost identical ramifications
at Clemson University.194 In November 2020, Clemson announced
that it would be cutting athletic teams.195 This announcement led
to the first class action suits filed by both male and female studentathletes alleging Title IX violations.196 Under the settlement agree188. See id. (reporting projected $150 million financial deficit because of
COVID-19 pandemic led to cuts in sport programs).
189. See Addison Dick et al., Dartmouth Reinstates Five Sports Teams, Citing Title
IX Compliance, DARTMOUTH (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.thedartmouth.com/article/2021/01/dartmouth-reinstates-five-sports-teams-citing-title-ix-compliance
[https://perma.cc/P7PP-7JGZ] (detailing legal action taken by Dartmouth College’s women’s swimming and diving team and women’s golf team in response to
team cuts).
190. See id. (citing lawyer hired by women’s swimming and diving team and
women’s golf team, alleging Dartmouth’s violation of Title IX by failing to meet
proportionality requirement while conceding prior to cutting women’s swimming
and diving and women’s golf teams, Dartmouth was compliant with Title IX by
accommodating interest of female student-athletes).
191. See id. (presenting final settlement agreement, which agreed to reinstate
women’s teams, conduct gender equity reviews, and reimburse legal fees).
192. See id. (quoting Dartmouth’s statement “elements of the data that Athletics used to confirm continued Title IX compliance may not have been complete”).
193. See id. (describing litigation threats as propelling Dartmouth to alter
compliance procedures).
194. See Hope Bellair, Clemson Adds Women’s Sports After Reinstating Cut Sports,
BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (June 24, 2021), https://businessofcollegesports.com/
olympicsports/clemson-adds-womens-sports-after-reinstating-cut-sports/ [https://
perma.cc/YY38-33T9] (analyzing Clemson University’s decision to reinstate cut
sports in conjunction with adding new women’s sports).
195. See id. (discussing Clemson University’s decision to cut men’s varsity
track and field).
196. See Male & Female Student-Athletes Win Historic Title IX Sex Discrimination
Settlements with Clemson University, BAILEY GLASSER LLP (Apr. 22, 2021), https://
www.baileyglasser.com/news-male-and-female-student-athletes-win-historic-title-ix-
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ment, Clemson agreed to reinstate cut teams, add new women’s varsity teams, and conduct a gender equity review to adopt and
develop a Gender Equity Plan.197 Accordingly, Clemson announced that it would be adding a women’s lacrosse team and women’s gymnastics team in direct response to the settlement
agreement.198 The Iowa, Dartmouth, and Clemson settlements
mentioned above are just a few in a line of Title IX settlement
agreements stemming from COVID-19 related athletic cuts.199
These agreements highlight that schools will attempt to remedy Title IX violations when threatened with legal action.200 Court decisions granting injunctions and subsequent settlement agreements
show that universities must address Title IX compliance issues and
need to remedy ineffective forms of data gathering.201 Looking forward, these settlement agreements may lead to substantial change
in equal gender access to collegiate sports.202 Particularly, many
schools that launched inquiries into gender reporting methods
might face a more grim noncompliance reality than was originally
realized.203
While the courts in Ohlensehlen and Balow came to different
conclusions regarding the appropriateness of injunctive relief, they
both exposed that universities continue to fail to provide proportional access to athletic opportunities for female athletes.204 The
settlement-clemson-university [https://perma.cc/L6MK-NJKC] (announcing settlement agreement following landmark class action suit brought by both male and
female student-athletes, alleging Title IX violations).
197. See id. (stating settlement agreement would add women’s lacrosse and
women’s gymnastics teams).
198. See id. (reporting Clemson University would add women’s lacrosse and
women’s gymnastics in next two years).
199. See id. (detailing similar settlement agreements at East Carolina University, University of North Carolina, Williams & Mary College, and Brown
University).
200. See id. (advocating “Clemson agreed to the history-making settlements
with both the male and female student-athletes to avoid the threatened suits”).
201. See id. (indicating Clemson University’s failures to ensure equal treatment for women athletes).
202. See Male & Female Student-Athletes Win Historic Title IX Sex Discrimination
Settlements with Clemson University, supra note 196 (detailing similar agreements
reached by other universities from 2020 through 2021).
203. See id. (analyzing how threatening to sue uncovered women athletes being deprived of at least $1.8 million in athletic financial aid- receiving only
$6,650,912 in athletic financial aid out of $16,859,840 while comprising 50.48% of
athletes).
204. See generally Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088
(S.D. Iowa 2020) (detailing existing Title IX violations that occurred prior to dissolution of women’s sports teams and citing COVID-19 as cause of financial
constraints).
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court in Balow used a heightened standard of review, and therefore
held that Plaintiffs were not likely to succeed in their claim.205
However, expert testimony established a gap in female opportunities in sports.206 Further, in Lazor, the court specifically declined to
follow and criticized the court in Balow for referring to the average
size of teams as a criterion for proportionality.207 In Lazor, the
court also granted injunctive relief to plaintiffs alleging Title IX violations when UConn eliminated their women’s rowing team citing
COVID-19 related budget constraints.208
The cases discussed above shed light on several requirements
for plaintiffs to succeed on their Title IX claims.209 The determining threshold in these suits has been to supply the court with accurate data showing gender participation gaps.210 A large portion of
these decisions are dedicated to examining the accuracy and methods by which experts evaluated athletic participation within universities. 211 Therefore, any plaintiff that seeks a preliminary
injunction to reinstate cut athletic teams on the basis of Title IX
violations must produce accurate data as to gender gaps in athletic
participation.212 Plaintiffs in jurisdictions with heightened standards of review, such as in Balow, will face a harder time convincing
a court that a preliminary injunction is necessary.213 However, that
burden is the heaviest portion of the preliminary injunction stan205. See Balow v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:21-CV-44, 2021 WL 650712, at *12
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2021) (utilizing higher review standard while acknowledging
gaps exposed by expert testimony).
206. See id. at *6 (describing expert testimony indicating participation gaps,
because ratio of male-to-female athletes is not proportional to number of participation opportunities necessary to achieve proportionality—estimating participation
gaps of thirty-three, thirty-seven, and thirty-five in seasons ending in 2018, 2019,
and 2020, respectively).
207. See Lazor v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:21-CV-583 (SRU), 2021 WL 2138832, at
*13 (D. Conn. May 26, 2021) (“For those reasons, I respectfully disagree
with Balow to the extent that it stands for the proposition that a participation gap
smaller than the average team size defines compliance with Title IX.”).
208. See id. at *1–2 (summarizing Plaintiffs’ claims alleging UConn’s Title IX
violations in cutting women’s sports programs).
209. See generally Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1088 (articulating standard of
review for Title IX violations).
210. See id. at 1088-90 (reviewing expert testimony analyzing disclosures
under Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act to determine athletic participation gaps).
211. See id. at 1098-99 (examining Defendant’s objection to Dr. Lopiano’s expert opinion as unduly speculative and reliant on inaccurate data).
212. See id. at 1100 (acknowledging requirement of reliability in expert opinions while finding Dr. Lopiano’s testimony to be “highly credible,” and “exceedingly reliable” in showing Title IX noncompliance).
213. See Balow v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:21-CV-44, 2021 WL 650712, at *12
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2021) (distinguishing standard of review in Ohlensehlen before
determining proper standard as likely-to-prevail).
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dards as courts agree that plaintiffs will face irreparable harm in
these situations, and Title IX compliance is in the public interest.214
These cases demonstrate that Title IX is an effective tool in
protecting gender equality in sports.215 Further, reinstatement
cases have brought a renewed focus on Title IX noncompliance
within colligate sports.216 However, these cases show that institutions must reevaluate and adjust their Title IX compliance efforts.217 Particularly, as more women enroll in college, there will be
a greater need for universities to reevaluate athletic opportunities
and resources.218 Many of the cases mentioned above have demonstrated that compliance information has been lacking.219 Therefore, settlement agreements that focus on enhancing data
gathering to better comply with Title IX requirements are beneficial for the future of gender equality.220 Accurate data regarding
athletic opportunities will hold institutions accountable, lead to
clarity in litigation proceedings, and provide student athletes with
equal treatment.221

214. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1102 (listing profound impact of cut
collegiate programs on Plaintiffs and describing harm faced as “irreparable,”
“existential”).
215. See Lorin, supra note 164 (emphasizing importance of Title IX litigation
threats in successful reinstatement cases).
216. See id. (“The Title IX reinstatement efforts may have a long-term impact
by bringing renewed focus on compliance with the law. . . . As college enrollment
increasingly tips towards women, there may be greater need for change in longstanding allocations of resources and teams.”).
217. See id. (emphasizing imperative nature of university commitments to renew focus on Title IX compliance following changes in make-up of enrollment).
218. See Kevin Carey, Men Fall Behind in College Enrollment. Women Still Play
Catch-Up at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/
09/upshot/college-admissions-men.html [https://perma.cc/8QBY-LU6S] (stating
female enrollment in college almost doubled over last half-century).
219. See generally Male & Female Student-Athletes Win Historic Title IX Sex Discrimination Settlements with Clemson University, supra note 196 (discussing requirement for
Clemson to implement data-collecting measures affecting Title IX compliance
efforts).
220. See Lorin, supra note 164 (emphasizing importance of elevated response
in Title IX compliance as make-up of college enrollment changes).
221. See Balow v. Michigan State Univ., No. 1:21-CV-44, 2021 WL 650712, at 13
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2021) (discussing importance of expert testimony using accurate athletic enrollment data). For further discussion of expert testimony and Title IX litigation, see supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE
UNCOVERING OF TITLE IX NONCOMPLIANCE IN
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides that
institutions receiving federal funding cannot discriminate on the
basis of sex.222 The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed issues of noncompliance with Title IX amongst collegiate sport programs and
forced revaluation of compliance procedures in many instances.223
During the pandemic, several sports teams, many of them women’s
teams, were cut due to budgetary concerns.224 Many institutions
either reversed course on their own under threat of Title IX litigation.225 Further, many institutions that proceeded in the litigation
process were forced to do so following court injunctions.226 Plaintiffs in these cases saw an opportunity to hold institutions accountable for already prevalent Title IX violations on the basis of gender
inequality in sport programs.227 COVID-19 related budget cuts
have therefore exposed ongoing Title IX violations that are only
exacerbated by continued cuts to women’s sports.228 Despite the
proclamation that the finish line for gender equality in collegiate
sports is near, the COVID-19 pandemic has uncovered compliance
issues rampant within the collegiate sport world and higher educa222. See 20 U.S.C.A § 1681(a) (West 1972) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex by withholding federal funds from Universities allowing or promoting
discrimination).
223. See Ohlensehlen v. Univ. of Iowa, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1088 (S.D. Iowa
2020) (detailing existing Title IX violations occurring prior to dissolution of women’s sports teams and citing COVID-19 as cause of financial constraints).
224. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (listing men’s gymnastics, men’s tennis,
men’s swimming, women’s swimming, and women’s diving all as cut sports
programs).
225. See Daniela Allee, Dartmouth College Reinstates Five Previously Cut Sports
Team, N.H. PUB. RADIO (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2021-0129/dartmouth-college-reinstates-five-previously-cut-sports-teams-after-threat-of-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/R3EG-CUQ7] (detailing Dartmouth College’s decision to
reinstate teams previously cut due to COVID-19 financial concerns after threats of
Title IX lawsuits).
226. See Ohlensehlen, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (detailing existing Title IX violations that occurred prior to dissolution of women’s sports teams and citing
COVID-19 caused financial constraints); see also Lazor v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:21CV-583 (SRU), 2021 WL 2138832, at *8 (D. Conn. May 26, 2021) (issuing injunction against University).
227. See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 5 (detailing one female athlete’s decision
to expose ongoing Title IX violations to reinstate cut athletic teams following
COVID-19 pandemic).
228. See id. (detailing decisions by female athletes to sue their universities for
Title IX noncompliance once coronavirus-related sport cuts were announced).
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tion institutions must be prepared to renew their focus on gender
equality in sports.229
Elizabeth Kletsel*
229. For further discussion of Brown University settlement agreement, see
supra notes 148–174 and accompanying text.
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